NO&T Japan Legal Update
Since the enactment of Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law (“AML”) in 2008, merger filings in China have become a common bottleneck for global M&A transactions due to the long time required for review and the difficulty in predicting the prospects for clearance. The implementation in 2014 of a simplified procedure available to transactions that satisfy certain market share thresholds or fall within certain circumstances, as well as the accumulation of experience by the State Administration for Market Regulation (“SAMR”), the Chinese antitrust authority, led to an overall improvement. However, in the past few years, several high-profile M&A transactions still needed significant time to obtain merger filing clearance in China despite utilizing the simplified procedure and having a relatively small impact on the Chinese market.
Well known examples include the acquisition of Kioxia (formerly Toshiba Memory) by a consortium of Japanese, US, and Korean funds in 2018 and the acquisition of Hitachi Metals by a consortium of Japanese and US funds in 2021, which only received clearance from SMAR in September of this year. Many companies are concerned that the prolonged review of these deals reflects the tense international environment and are looking for guidance on what type of M&A transaction is more likely to face delays.
The length of time required for SAMR’s review of the merger filings is typically longer in when “sensitive” industrial fields are involved. Generally speaking, SAMR tends to regard the following as “sensitive”: (a) industries that can be affected by volatility in international relationships such as tension between the U.S. and China, and (b) industries related to the infrastructure or energy fields that are considered to be important from an economic or national security perspective. While these are not well-defined criteria, an example of each would be semiconductors and rare-earth elements, respectively.
There are two possible reasons for SAMR’s lengthy review:
On the other hand, there are some circumstances where SAMR’s review is likely to be lengthy regardless of the sensitivity of the relevant industries:
Under the previous Chinese AML, the review period for a merger filing was divided into first review (30 days), a second review (90 days), and a third review (60 days). Once the review had begun, SAMR would not stop the clock, which meant that the maximum review period was up to 180 days.
Under the amended Chinese AML, however, which came into force on August 1, 2022, SAMR may suspend the review period in certain circumstances. Namely, (i) if a party fails to submit documents and materials requested by SAMR; (ii) new facts or circumstances arise that have a significant impact on SAMR’s review; or (iii) further consideration of remedial measures is required.
Although this amendment gives SAMR the explicit power to stop the clock, previously, when more time was required to complete the review, SAMR frequently required the parties to pull the application and refile (i.e. withdraw and resubmit the filing). Thus, in practical terms, the amendment is unlikely to significantly change the likelihood or duration of SAMR’s review.
Simultaneously with the revised AML entering into force, SAMR began outsourcing simplified reviews to the local SAMR branch offices relevant to the particular M&A transaction. It is thought that this move may affect the length of the review process negatively in the short term, but positively in the long run. Until now, local SAMR branch offices have been responsible for the investigation and penalty of cartels and abuse of market dominant power in antitrust enforcement but lack experience in conducting merger filing examinations, which has been the cause of additional delay. Nevertheless, in the long run, outsourcing simplified reviews to local branch offices may have the positive effect of addressing the manpower shortage of the central SAMR, which is another often cited reason for the prolonged review process.
In summary, Chinese merger filing review process is not as mysterious and unreasonable as one might think, but there are still many unique aspects of the review approach and process. In addition to the above, finding reliable and experienced local lawyers (as Chinese authorities, including SAMR, generally are not willing to directly consult or communicate with foreign based law firms, even with their China branch office) is also an important factor in whether the antitrust review can be shortened. In this regard, it is worth noting that antitrust law practice in China has only had a brief history and has evolved uniquely. Thus the level of local antitrust lawyers is quite varied, which often leads to miscommunication and even strategic miscalculations. Therefore, it is important for companies as well as main counsels outside of China to take a greater role in merger filing process.
This newsletter is given as general information for reference purposes only and therefore does not constitute our firm’s legal advice. Any opinion stated in this newsletter is a personal view of the author(s) and not our firm’s official view. For any specific matter or legal issue, please do not rely on this newsletter but make sure to consult a legal adviser. We would be delighted to answer your questions, if any.
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